Making the Game Beautiful Again: Lessons from Brazil Provide a Roadmap for Rebuilding Soccer in Nigeria by Cates, John
MAKING THE GAME BEAUTIFUL AGAIN: LESSONS FROM BRAZIL
PROVIDE A ROADMAP FOR REBUILDING SOCCER IN NIGERIA
John Cates*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. IN TRODU CTION ............................................................................... 366
II. SOCCER IN B RAZIL .......................................................................... 368
A. Corruption and Mismanagement of Soccer in Brazil ............... 370
B. Legal Reform in Brazilian Soccer ............................................ 372
III. SOCCER IN N IGERIA ........................................................................ 377
A. Corruption and Mismanagement of Nigerian Soccer .............. 379
B. Past and Current Legislation in Nigeria and a Roadmap for
F urther R eform ......................................................................... 383
IV . C ON CLU SION ................................................................................... 388
* J.D., University of Georgia School of Law, 2012; M.B.A., University of Georgia, Terry
College of Business, 2012; B.A., Philosophy, University of Georgia, 2007.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Nigerian soccer' stands at an important crossroads where laws and
regulations must be put in place if the nation's favorite sport is to survive.
Soccer is a source of significant social and economic benefit for Nigeria,2
and to let it fall into utter disrepair would prove devastating to an already
struggling nation and its economy.3 As will be discussed below, corruption
and mismanagement, by both the government and the Nigeria Football
Federation (NFF) have caused Nigeria's best players to leave for Europe to
play in the prominent leagues of England and France, among others.4
However, Nigeria is not alone in experiencing growing pains when it
comes to its most popular sport. Brazil was in a similar position during the
last few decades, but the corrective measures taken by its government's
leaders appear to have saved the sport, or at least placed it on the right path.5
Like soccer in Brazil, soccer is so intertwined with the fabric and economy
of Nigeria that, if the sport remains in corrupt hands and continues its
demise, the entire nation will suffer.
6
1 The terms "soccer" and "football" will be used interchangeably throughout this paper, as
"soccer" is referred to as "football" in countries outside of the United States.
2 See Wiebe Boer, A Story of Heroes, of Epics: The Rise of Football in Nigeria, in
FOOTBALL IN AFRICA: CONFLICT, CONCILIATION, AND COMMUNITY 59, 59-60 (Gary Armstrong
& Richard Giulianotti eds., 2004) (explaining that soccer in Nigeria is much more than a
sport, bringing together people of different racial and religious backgrounds and promoting a
sense of pride in the nation's teams and leagues).
3 See Gabriel Omoh, Which Way Nigeria in 2009 - Economy in Shambles, VANGUARD
(Mar. 8, 2009), available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200903091104.html (noting that the
economic downturn was especially harsh in Nigeria, and explaining that these economic
effects were exacerbated by corruption and mismanagement).
4 See Nigerian Soccer Players in Europe, THE BEST ELEVEN (Aug. 12, 2008, 9:30 AM),
http://www.thebesteleven.com/2008/08/nigerian-soccer-players-in-europe.html (detailing the
large number of Nigerian players who play outside of Nigeria for some of the most
recognizable and prestigious soccer teams in the world).
5 Simon Hooper, Brazil's Ugly Game: World Cup Shouldn't Distract from Corruption
Fight, CNNSI.cOM (July 4, 2002), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/soccer/news/2002/07/04/w
aag.july4/.
See Oluwashina Okeleji, FIFA Loses Faith in Nigeria, BBC SPORT (Jan. 27, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/africa/7853991 .stm (discussing the problems faced by
the Nigerian government and soccer-governing bodies as they prepared Nigeria for the 2009
FIFA Under-17 World Cup; and also detailing both the importance of football to the people of
Nigeria, and Africa as a whole, and the need for successful World Cup events staged in
African nations).
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There are similarities between these two countries that allow for this
comparison: both recently changed from military dictatorships to
democracies,7 both have large amount of talented soccer players, both place
soccer at a very high level of importance as a point of national pride, and
both are trying to deal with the corruption and mismanagement that led to the
exodus of the country's best soccer players8. Given all of the similarities
between Brazil and Nigeria-Nigerian leaders should seek to understand the
history, politics, and the national role of soccer in Brazil. If any good can
come from the tough lessons that Brazil learned, it may be that Nigeria can
apply these lessons to stop the demise, and therefore ensure a better future
for its beloved game and for its citizens. Nigeria may attain such a goal by
passing laws and regulations similar to those enacted in Brazil, with the
anticipation that they will have a similar effect.
This Note argues that Nigeria will benefit from enacting laws and
regulations resembling those passed in Brazil during the last fifteen years.
Part II provides a brief historical background of the game of soccer in Brazil,
the relevant political history of Brazil, and an outline of Brazilian soccer's
governing body, the Confederation of Brazilian Football (CBF). Part II also
traces the history and causes of corruption and mismanagement of soccer in
Brazil, which finally led to regulatory reform. This Part also describes and
analyzes the actions taken by the Brazilian legislature to curb corruption and
correct the game's trajectory between the 1980s and today.
Part III provides historical background on Nigeria and its soccer-
governing body, the NFF, and discusses the importance of saving the
country's most popular sport. Similar to the discussion of Brazil, Part III
provides background and specific examples of the corruption and
mismanagement of soccer in Nigeria, most of which occurred in the last ten
to fifteen years. This section first looks at pertinent past and present laws in
Nigeria, then demonstrates how this legal structure and outdated laws led to
the current state of soccer in Nigeria, and finally, applies the Brazilian
reforms to establish a framework for legislation and reform in Nigeria.
7 See JOs MURILO DE CARVALHO, THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL: POSSIBLE
LESSONS FOR NIGERIA 5 (2000), available at http://www.globalcitizen.net/Data/Pages/1759/pape
rs/20090220133735533.pdf (detailing Brazil's history toward becoming a democracy); see also
Ian Bremmer, Nigeria's Fragile Democracy, N.Y. SUN (July 28, 2008), http://www.nysun.com/
opinion/nigerias-fragile-democracy/82713/ (describing recent obstacles and challenges faced by
the new Nigerian democracy).
8 Nigerian Soccer Players in Europe, supra note 4.
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II. SOCCER IN BRAZIL
Soccer arrived in Brazil in 1894;9 about the same time, Brazil became an
independent republic.' At this time, Brazil was defining its national identity
and the game of soccer provided a unifying attribute." During the next thirty
to forty years, Brazil evolved from a fledgling nation to the home of one of
the greatest national soccer teams 2 in the world.' 3 Brazil has won more
FIFA World Cups14 than any other nation and has produced some of the most
talented players 15 that the world has ever seen. In 1958, the Brazilian
national team won the FIFA World Cup--the first of three World Cup titles
for Brazil in a twelve-year period. 16  The national team's success further
9 ALEX BELLOS, FUTEBOL: THE BRAZILIAN WAY OF LIFE 1 (2002).
10 See Brazil, CIA: THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/br.html (expand the "Introduction" tab to see "Background") (last
updated Jan. 17, 2011) ("Brazil gained its independence in 1822, maintaining a monarchical
system of government until the ... subsequent proclamation of a republic by the military in
1889.").
11 See BELLOS, supra note 9, at 1-2 (discussing the remarkable ethnic diversity of the
Brazilian peoples and how the national team evokes thoughts of a "utopian racial harmony"
when playing the "beautiful game" in "football country").
12 For purposes of this discussion of Brazil and Nigeria, "team" refers to one of two types
of teams: a club team or a national team. Club teams are local teams that compete against one
another in tournaments; typically, club teams are privately owned. The national team, on the
other hand, is a single team comprised of the best players in the country. While a country may
have many club teams, it only has one national team. The club-team structure is comparable
to the structure of the National Basketball Association (NBA), while the national team is
comparable to the single U.S. basketball team that represents the U.S. in the Olympics. While
this Note addresses problems and solutions for of soccer as a whole in both Brazil and
Nigeria, it is important to remember that there are structural and political differences between
a club team and a national team. Also, due to the focus of scholarly literature and the
additional notoriety, this Note primarily addresses concerns with men's soccer.
13 See BELLOS, supra note 9, at 2 ("Brazil is football's most successful nation .. "); see
also Brazil, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/associations/association=bra/index.html (last visited
Mar. 20, 2011) (showing Brazil's honors, including appearances in all nineteen FIFA World
Cup competitions and World Cup victories in 1958, 1962, 1970, 1994, and 2002).
The World Cup is a tournament hosted by the Federation Internationale de Football
Association (FIFA), held every four years in a host-country chosen by FIFA. The FIFA
World Cup matches the best thirty-two men's national teams after a rigorous qualifying
process. See FIFA World Cup: About FIFA, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/worldcup/
index.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2011).
15 See, e.g., Pele, INTERNATIONAL FOOTBALL HALL OF FAME, http://www.ifhof.com/hof/
pele.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2011) (detailing the illustrious career of one of Brazil's many
famous players, Pel6, whom many consider to be one of the most exciting and skilled players
to ever play).
16 See Previous FIFA World Cups, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/archive/index.html
[Vol. 39:365
MAKING THE GAME BEAUTIFUL AGAIN
ingrained the sport into Brazilian society, and Brazil was chosen to host the
1950 World Cup. 17  Soccer brought the Brazilian people together and it
became increasingly important that their national team performed well. 8
When Brazil lost the 1950 World Cup title to Uruguay, Roberto daMatta, a
famous Brazilian anthropologist, described it as " 'perhaps the greatest
tragedy in contemporary Brazilian history.' ,,19 While this designation may
seem exaggerated, it is at least arguable that when the national team loses,
the entire nation feels the loss.
Given the unifying nature of soccer and Brazil's successful national team,
it is no wonder that politicians capitalized on its popularity and used the
team's success to bolster their own success and agenda, especially the
military dictators that intermittently ruled Brazil. 20  The last of these
dictatorships exhibited this connection by playing the theme song of the 1970
FIFA World Cup winning team at political rallies, and using the star of that
World Cup team, PelN6, as a poster-child for Brazil. 21 However, at the same
time that Brazil's leader was celebrating Brazils' success on the soccer field,
and promoting national pride in the country's success under this dictatorship,
Brazil suffered through the oil crisis of the early 1970s, which eventually led
to high inflation and both economic and political turmoil.22
After almost thirty years of dictatorships, Brazilians elected Fernando
Collor de Mello as their president.23 Though he was not the first leader to
use soccer as a means of advancing personal political goals and ideas,
"Collor was []the first Brazilian president who started public life as the
president of a [soccer] club."24 This connection between Brazilian soccer
and politics also paved the way for the mismanagement that brought the
(last visited Mar. 20, 2011) (showing Brazil's World Cup titles in 1958, 1962, and 1970).
17 See BELLOS, supra note 9, at 45 ("Optimism was galvanised by confirmation that in 1950
the country would host the fourth football World Cup, the most important international event
to take place within its frontiers.").
18 See generally id. at 45-46 ("To honour the importance of the World Cup and reflect the
grandeur of national aspiration, Brazil decided to build the largest stadium in the world." The
author also outlines how the city prepared in every way possible for the event.).
'9 Id. at 45.
20 See FRANKLIN FOER, How SOCCER EXPLAINS THE WORLD: AN UNLIKELY THEORY OF
GLOBALIZATION 122-24 (2004) (describing the use of Peld's name and likeness by Brazil's
various military dictators).
21 Id.
22 Id. at 124.
23 BELLOS, supra note 9, at 295.
24 Id. at 296.
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game to its knees in the last few decades, as players fled Brazilian leagues
25because of corrupt conditions.
A. Corruption and Mismanagement of Soccer in Brazil
The famous Brazilian soccer player, Ronaldo, after signing a large
contract to play for an Italian club team in 1998, told reporters "I wouldn't
return to Brazil now for any offer., 26 This statement sums up the effect that
corruption had on Brazilian soccer. Brazil produces some of the best players
in the world, yet many of them do not play soccer in Brazil.27 Over 5,000
Brazilian players have contracts with soccer teams outside of Brazil; of the
twenty-two players on Brazil's national team in the 1998 FIFA World Cup,
only seven played for a Brazilian club in 2000.28 A long track record of poor
decisions combined with a corrupt soccer environment caused Brazil-a
country that produces the best players-to watch as Europe's club teams
become far more successful and profitable than those of Brazil.29
While it is difficult to pinpoint when the corruption began in Brazilian
soccer, by the 1960s, corrupt practices in the Brazilian soccer environment
were common.30 During the second half of the nineteenth century, there was
little to no financial accountability of the club teams' managers.3 The
leagues' structures at this time provided that the team leaders received no
formal salary; yet, these leaders appeared to live extravagant lifestyles.32 At
25 FOER, supra note 20, at 121.
26 id.
27 See Top Fifty Players of the 2010 World Cup, ESPN, http://soccemet.espn.go.com/world-c
up/story/_/page/worldcupl 01-03012010/ce/us/top-50-players-2010-world-cup&cc=5901 ?ver=us
(last visited Mar. 20, 2011) (demonstrating that six of the world's best fifty players are Brazilian
and that none of them play in Brazil).
28 FOER, supra note 20, at 131.
29 See Antonio Carlos Kfouri Aidar et al., Recent History of Brazilian Soccer, in
INTERNATIONAL SPORTS ECONOMICS COMPARISONS 245, 253 tbl.1 (Rodney Fort & John Fizel
eds., 2004) (displaying that the average television revenues in Brazil during the 1999-2000
season were approximately $80 million USD, compared to $390 million in Italy and $300
million in England; the average annual attendance for club team games in Brazil was 15,000,
compared to 31,882 in Germany; and the total club revenues in Brazil during the 1999-2000
season were $200 million, compared to $795 million in England).
30 See FOER, supra note 20, at 123 (detailing the corruption and mismanagement that
surrounded Pel6 during his professional career).
31 Id. at 116-17 ("T]heir status as nonprofit amateur enterprises... means that [the soccer
clubs'] finances are not subjected to public scrutiny; their executives have no legal
accountability.").32 See id. at 117 (quoting the ex-president of the CBF, Jo~o Havelenge saying, "I take no
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the close of each financial cycle, it appeared as though all of the revenue was
lost through the operations process, suggesting that the teams were operating
in a loss position, and should not have funds remaining for club managers.33
Despite the reported loses, club managers appeared to be living comfortably
and saw increases in their personal finances. This disparity suggests that the
club administrators took revenue distributions directly from the club before
the close of each financial period instead of reinvesting this revenue in the
club and its players. 34 This amateur, non-profit 35 structure of Brazil's soccer
leagues allowed this kind of corruption. Moreover, it was an optimum
environment for someone with political ambitions to use the game and its
fans to support personal and political interests.
The intermingling of soccer with politics is significant because before
legislative reform in Brazil, politicians were immune from prosecution.36
This immunity allowed politicians to perform unscrupulous business
transactions within their clubs, and also to use the visibility of the clubs to
ensure reelection and retention of prosecutorial immunity.37 This practice
was especially harmful because many governmental leaders were also the
leaders of soccer clubs. 38 However, this corruption was finally revealed, not
because of admission by a corrupt club leader, but rather because of Brazil's
defeat in the 1998 World Cup.
39
salary, just enough expenses to get by on.").
33 id.
34 See id. at 117-18 (describing a suspicious set of circumstances, whereby in 1998, a club
team in Brazil received over $34 million in cash as an investment from an American bank, and
within two years, most of the money had vanished-reportedly, $124,000 for campaign t-
shirts for the club's president (up for reelection in the Brazilian legislature), and $12 million to
four Bahamian bank accounts for a company called "Liberal Banking Corporation Limited").
35 See id. at 116 (describing that, at this time, each local team in Brazil was called a "club
team" because each team was based in a "country club" type of organization, with swimming
pools, tennis courts, etc., and while the club teams paid their players, because each team was a
part of a larger "club," they had dues-paying members, which qualified the club for non-profit,
amateur status under the law and excused them from public scrutiny of their finances).
36 Id. at 118.
37 Id.
38 See BELLOS, supra note 9, at 293 ("The presidents of three other national first division
teams - Sport, Santa Cruz and Cruzeiro - have also sat in the lower house in recent years.
There are Congressmen who are presidents of smaller teams and Congressmen with positions
in state football federations.").
'9 See id at 317-19 (detailing the impassionate performance of the team, the questions
surrounding player Ronaldo, and the role of the sponsor, Nike).
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B. Legal Reform in Brazilian Soccer
As the twenty-first century approached, a series of events led to reform in
Brazilian soccer. First, the Brazilian national team lost to France in the final
game of the 1998 World Cup, leading to a congressional investigation about
why the team played so poorly.40 During this investigation, legislators began
to question the large, lucrative contracts between the national team and some
of its players, and Nike.4
Nike entered into a ten-year, $160 million sponsorship contract with the
CBF, the largest contract ever at that time for any national team. Aldo
Rebelo, a Brazilian congressman, launched a Parliamentary Commission of
Inquiry (CPI) to determine if there had been any foul play between Nike and
the CBF.4 3 Rebelo believed that Nike "debased the national team by forcing
it to play an inordinate number of lesser nations purely for the purposes of
marketing. '4 4 The investigation also showed that a great portion of the Nike
contract money was missing from the CBF bank account.45
It is interesting to note the lack of investigations of club managers or
directors of the CBF, especially while club teams continued to lose players
and revenue to European clubs. As a result, the corruption and
mismanagement of the game emerged only when the national team began
losing games. The national team's loss in the 1998 World Cup, further
compounded by its loss in the 2000 Olympics, gave the anti-corruption
movement in Brazil enough public support to finally begin.46
During the years of this investigation, Pel6, Brazil's most famous player
and newly-appointed Minister of Sports, began examining the national team
and the operation of soccer in Brazil.47  Pel6 and a select group of
"traditional soccer leadership" launched a probe into the soccer clubs to
40 Id. at 319-20 ("Congressman [ ] Aldo Rebelo... entered a petition in the House of
Deputies-the lower house of Congress-to start an inquiry into the Nike-CBF contract. He
based his argument on the possibility that the contract could have violated 'sovereignty,
autonomy and national identity', which are guaranteed by the Brazilian constitution.").
41 Id.
42 Id. at 319.
41 See id. at 319-20, 322 (explaining that a CPI is the most expansive and serious type of
congressional hearing in the Brazilian legislature as it grants the initiator unlimited access to
bank accounts, tax forms, and other records).
" Id. at 324.
45 See id. at 348 (discussing that the club would have been insolvent as a corporation,
despite spending all of the Nike contract money).
4 See id. at 318, 322.
47 Aidar at al., supra note 29, at 245.
[Vol. 39:365
MAKING THE GAME BEAUTIFUL AGAIN
uncover the specific acts of corruption and mismanagement that plagued the
league.48  Their efforts ultimately resulted in legislation-known in the
Brazilian legislature as "Pel's Law"9--that sought to reform the Brazilian
game.50 However, Pelt's Law met much resistance by club and federation
officials, as well as club owners, who did not want to lose the revenues from
corrupt operations. 51 Eventually, Peld's Law weakened to a legislative bill
that simply created free agency52 in the clubs and that only attempted to
restructure the clubs into organizations.53 However, this result created
greater instability for the players, because free agency allowed the most well-
funded clubs who are possibly the most corrupt, to acquire any player
without a transfer fee.54
The importance of Pelt's Law is not in the actual wording or structure of
the statute. Instead, one could argue that its power comes from the fact that
Pel6 himself, as the nation's most influential athlete, publicly took a stand
against the corruption he saw in soccer and put the corrupt leaders under
increasing public scrutiny. These leaders were so corrupt, in fact, that at the
end of a lengthy investigation of soccer in Brazil, Senator Alvaro Dias
publicly stated that the CBF, many of whose leaders were club owners and
coaches, was "truly a den of crime, disorganization, anarchy, incompetence
and dishonesty. 55
Under pressure from these "cartolas, 56 Pel6 held a press conference
in 2001 with the head of the CBF, an infamously corrupt club leader, and
explained that he no longer supported the investigations and, instead, was
going to work with the cartolas.57
48 Id.
49 id.
50 See id. at 255 (explaining that Peld's Law was not the first attempt to reform the game in
Brazil; "Zico's Law," passed in 1993, allowed teams to become for-profit institutions and also
codified the sports law, which paved the way for future legislation).
51 Id. at 246 ("[Sitate federations and the [CBF] are striving to undermine this
modernization process. Some of its managers ... are now under accusation of corruption.").
52 See id. at 255-56 (explaining that when a club wishes to acquire a player from another
club, not only must it pay the player, it must also pay the former club for the right to acquire
the player-a free agency system eliminates this transfer fee and, in the eyes of opponents of
Peld's Law, creates a disincentive for smaller, lesser-funded clubs to invest in young players
(knowing they will not be if a wealthier club acquires a player).
" Id. at 255.
54 id.
55 Hooper, supra note 5.
56 FOER, supra note 20, at 117 ("Top Hats" in Portuguese).
57 See id. at 132-33 (describing the set of circumstances surrounding Pelt's change of heart
and explaining that, after Pel6 publicly rescinded negative feelings toward the leaders of the
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In 2001, those in Congress who still supported the anti-corruption
movement proposed Provisional Measure 2193/2001 (PM 2193), which
addressed labor issues, contract provisions, player contract terms, transfer
fees, and player age requirements. 8 One important provision of PM 2193 is
the requirement that when a team acquires a player from a Brazilian club, the
acquiring team must pay both a transfer fee and a fee that goes toward the
education costs of that player, if the player is of a certain age.59 The transfer
fee requirement solves a problem created by Pelt's Law; without transfer
fees, a player's former club receives no compensation when a player is
traded or sold to another team which discourages the development of
players.60 Also, PM 2193's educational fee requirement provides that the
new club must take responsibility for the education of players of a certain
age.6' If the acquiring club cannot afford to pay this educational fee, then it
cannot acquire the player. This fee structure is also important because a club
in Europe must not only pay the player's former Brazilian club for the right
to acquire the player, but it must also reimburse the Brazilian club for any
educational costs associated with the player.
PM 2193 also placed wage caps on the above-described fee requirements
and ensured that a player could not be bought or traded without receiving all
owed wages, thereby promoting financial responsibility on the part of the
club owners.62 These compensation provisions also protect the players, who
can be paid for up to six months after the end of their contract, allowing them
time to find other employment.63 This provision extends the regular contract
length, allowing a club more time to trade a player, which in turn, benefits
the player because it promotes a system where clubs held responsible for the
player personnel decisions that they make.64
Equally as important, PM 2193 implemented an improved investment
structure for the clubs.65 The former laws ensured centralized power within
game and admitted that he made a mistake by launching the investigation, the "anti-corruption
crusaders" turned on him, and his legislative efforts were passed in a much less potent form).58 Aidar et al., supra note 29, at 255-56.
59 Id. at 256.
60 Id. at 255.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 256.
64 Id. at 256-57.
65 See id. at 257 (explaining that, under the former laws, clubs were set up such that "only
officers of the club with an effective commission could execute agreements or
commitments").
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the club; very few decision makers provided oversight or guidance to the
actions of the club's board.66 As a result, these laws discouraged foreign
investment in soccer licensing, merchandising, or advertising.67  By
increasing the number of people within each club with authority to execute
agreements, PM 2193 allowed investors, including foreign investors, to
actively participate in the decisions of a club,68 solving the previous situation
where investors were precluded from knowing how their money was used.
69
For these reasons, it is not surprising that foreign investment had all but left
soccer in Brazil, and the players, unsure about being compensate, left Brazil
to play for regulated European clubs with contractual obligations to pay their
players' salaries on time.70
Another important feature of PM 2193 is its requirements for a club's
corporate structure went a step further than both Zico's Law and Pelts Law.
PM 2193 not only allowed clubs to transform from non-profit entities into
corporations, it also established penalties for failing to do so.7 1 Since this
rule forced clubs to become corporations, the clubs became subject to federal
oversight and regulation like all other Brazilian corporations. This
requirement promoted financial responsibility and ensured that investments
in soccer clubs were protected by Brazilian law.
An impressive aspect of PM 2193 is that it requires each club to publish
financial statements that must be certified quarterly and annually by
independent auditors.72  This provision held club leaders personally
accountable for any inaccuracies in the statements and subjected club leaders
to Congressional hearings if the independent auditors found any suspicious
activities within the club's finances.73 This measure gives further comfort to
66 id.
67 id.
68 id.
69 See id. at 258 ("[Transparency] is precisely what has been demanded... by
investors....").
70 See, e.g., ALL PARTY PARLIAMENTARY FOOTBALL, ENGLISH FOOTBALL AND ITS
GOVERNANCE 3-12 (2009), available at http://www.allpartyfootball.com/APFG_Report-on-E
nglish Football_&_ItsGovernance April 2009%5B1%5D.pdf (detailing the extensive
corporate governance requirements for each club in the English Premier League, explaining
the rights of each club and player, and explaining the federal regulations and their relationship
to the players' contractual obligations).
71 See Aidar et al., supra note 29, at 257 (explaining that the failure of a club to incorporate
would result in that club not receiving compensation for players and in the club manager
papng out-of-pocket for any unsettled club debts).
2 Id. at 258.
73 Id.
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foreign investors, who can also investigate the internal operations of the club
before investing.
PM 2193 also established regional professional soccer leagues to replace
the separate state federations.74 Previously, Brazilian soccer clubs were
localized by states; each state's team played other states' teams in
tournaments hosted by the CBF and the individual state soccer-governing
bodies.75 The tournaments were disorganized and rarely occurred on a
regular annual schedule.76 By establishing regional leagues as incorporated
commercial companies, investors could trust the development of the league,
instead of relying on just one state team.77 Leagues needed more people,
causing more pairs of eyes to monitor the financial activities of the teams in
the league. The emphasis in a league, therefore, is on the entire organization,
not only on one team. As such, success is measured by how all of the teams
play, and thus generate revenues, instead of focusing on a single team's
performance and revenue. Since success is determined in the aggregate, the
league is incentivized to ensure the welfare of each and every team. This
allows for teams and leagues to operate like a corporate business, rather than
a sole proprietorship that a single leader uses for personal benefit.
The final important provision of PM 2193 established the National Sports
Council (NSC), which acts as an oversight and advisory board, and also as an
intermediary between players, team owners, and league officials. 78 With the
creation of an intermediary organization, all conflicts and disagreements are
to be resolved by an independent third party. The NSC also provides an
extension of the government, whose sole responsibility is to promote the
successful future of sports within Brazil.
While the reforms passed in Brazil are far from perfect, they provide a
general framework for other nations experiencing similar problems of
corruption and mismanagement in leagues, clubs, tournaments, and players.
An important theme of these reformed laws is that the best soccer leagues
and tournaments will thrive when the power and control is given to a larger
74 id.
" Id. at 251.
76 See id. at 249 (stating that, until the reforms by Peld and others, there was no central,
agreed-upon calendar by which the tournaments were played each year and as a result, fans
had a hard time purchasing season tickets, investors would never know when to promote
merchandise and club interest, and television networks would refuse to televise the games
because they could not determine a set time to sell the commercial space).
77 See id. at 258 (discussing the development of soccer as a league and as an important
economic activity in the long run).
71 Id. at 259.
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number of people, and when one club or team is not subjected to the
aspirations of one powerful individual. There is a need for accountability
and transparency in any organization, and soccer, particularly in nations that
have a combination of sensitive economic and political histories and an
intense national passion for the game, should be regulated in the same way as
any other profitable industry. As evidenced by Brazil's recent history, soccer
is a valuable economic and social asset, but can be rendered worthless when
control falls into the wrong hands.
III. SOCCER IN NIGERIA
From the local bonds developed at the club level to the national identity
established at the national team level, soccer is much more than a game in
Nigeria.79  The local club teams allow smaller towns to express their
individual identities, while the national team provides a unifying symbol of
how Nigeria can overcome individual differences to achieve great things.80
Further, the success of the Nigerian national team in international
tournaments, such as the World Cup and the Olympics, enabled Nigeria to
receive international recognition-something that it has not received in other
areas of international relations. 81 As a country with many different cultures
82
and belief systems, Nigeria relies on soccer as a source of national unity.
Like Brazil, European colonization introduced soccer to Nigeria.83 The
British began occupying Nigeria in the mid-nineteenth century and, during
the following 150 years, Nigeria was split into two regions: the northern
region, with an Islamic-structured hierarchy, where the British ruled
indirectly through Islamic leaders; and the southern region, where the British
ruled directly.84 Because most of Nigeria's social elite lived in the northern
region, their children grew up playing "high society" British sports like
cricket and polo; meanwhile, while missionaries in the southern region
introduced "middle-class" sports like soccer to the children.85
79 See Boer, supra note 2, at 59 (illustrating the significance of soccer in Nigerian culture by
explaining that, in 2000, to settle a dispute between the two branches of the newly-formed
Nigerian democracy, the legislative and the executive branches played a soccer match at the
national team's stadium, with both branches wearing the Nigerian national team's jerseys).
80 Id.
81 Id. at 59-60.
82 Id.
83 id.
84 Id. at 61.
81 Id. at 61-62.
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As people migrated from the southern region of Nigeria to the northern
region, soccer began to spread throughout the entire country.86 Eventually,
people in the northern region saw the motivating and unifying power that
soccer had Nigerians, and the game became so popular that leaders started
organizing nationwide games and, by the 1950s, exhibition tournaments with
European nations hosted by some of Nigeria's larger cities.87
On October 1, 1960, Nigeria gained independence from the United
Kingdom, thus becoming a sovereign nation.88 Over the next forty years,
every time that a new military regime established rule in Nigeria, the national
team seemed to take another step toward bringing international recognition
to Nigeria as a great soccer-playing nation.89 In the 1980s, economic
conditions worsened.90 As conditions declined, there was less money to pay
the national players and talented Nigerian players began to leave to play in
countries whose club teams could afford to pay them.91
However, through the 1990s, even as Nigerian players left for other
countries, the Nigerian national team became stronger.92 The success of the
national team shed positive light on Nigeria. Finally, in 2000, Nigeria was
selected to co-host the African Cup of Nations with Ghana-the first time
that Nigeria would be in the spotlight since establishing a new democracy in
1998. 93 Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, unlike the military dictators
before him, did not embrace the power that soccer had with the people of
86 Id. at 67.
87 id.
88 Id. at 68.
89 See id. at 68-73 (discussing how, only a few weeks after the nation became independent,
the new government used soccer's influence as a means of trying to establish order and unity
by building a new 30,000-seat stadium and also explaining that, after the oil boom in the
1970s, the military government in Nigeria supported the national team by building new
training grounds, resulting in Nigeria qualifying for the African Nations Cup and the
Olympics in 1976).90Id. at 7 1.
91 See id. (explaining that, in 2002, players as young as thirteen years old were leaving the
country to play elsewhere and that almost the entire Nigerian national team played for a club
team outside of Nigeria).
92 See id. at 73 (detailing that by 1993, Nigeria's youth teams had won two Junior World
Cup titles; in 1994, the senior men's national team won the African Nations Cup
championship; and in 1996, the national team won the gold medal at the Atlanta Olympics,
which was heralded as one of the greatest athletic achievements for any African nation). All
of these accomplishments occurred under Nigeria's last dictator, General Abacha, who, like
many of the Nigerian leaders before him, used the game as a means to promote Nigerian unity
and to reinforce his political influence. Id. at 73-74.
93 Id.
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Nigeria; however, fans still flocked to the African Cup games en masse.9 4
Unfortunately, large crowds rioted at every game, and some fans even
stormed the offices of the tournament administrators.
95
A. Corruption and Mismanagement of Nigerian Soccer
Even though the Nigerian national team experienced some success on the
international level over the last twenty years, the best soccer players continue
to leave Nigeria to play in the best European leagues-notably the English
Premier League- largely due to rampant corruption and mismanagement of
soccer in Nigeria.96 While the Premier League in England rises to the
highest level of international competition, attendance at Nigerian soccer
games declines as the country's best players are lured away to play in
England.97 In fact, one a Nigerian club team coach remarked, "Whenever we
play at the same time as an Arsenal game, nobody shows up.' "98 Nigerian
players leave because the Nigerian teams cannot pay the players comparably
for similar services provided in England.99 Salaries in Nigeria cannot match
those in England because of the corruption; leaders of the soccer leagues and
national soccer associations in Nigeria either keep or mismanage the teams'
funds, such that little money remains to pay the players. 00
To understand the corruption and mismanagement of Nigerian soccer, it
is necessary to understand the structure of Nigerian soccer's governing body,
the Nigeria Football Federation (NFF). Unlike Brazil, where the main
problems of corruption and mismanagement originated from corrupt and
politically-motivated club team owners and not from Brazilian soccer's
governing body, the problems in Nigeria were directly related to the NFF and
9" Id. at 74.
95 Id. at 74-75; see also Trouble Casts Doubt on Nigeria World Cup 2010 Bid, AUST.
BROADCASTING CORP. NEWS (June 13, 2003), http://abc.net.au/news/stories/2003/06/13/8788
40.htm (citing examples of several games in which Nigeria played where fans were rioting in
the streets, including throwing bottles and other objects at opposing fans and teams; after a
game between Nigeria and Congo, which resulted in a 0-0 tie, the Nigerian players had to be
locked in their locker room by police because fans were gathered in protest).
96 Andrew Walker, Is Premier League Killing Nigerian Football?, BBC NEWS (July 28,
2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7526005.stm.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 See id. (" 'When a player won't even be paid £1,000 ($2,000) per month in Nigeria, but
can get £1,000 a week in Europe, what do you expect?' says Tukur Babangida, Chairman of
Kano Pillars, champions in Nigeria's top league [in 2008].").
100 Id.
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its connection to the National Sports Commission 1°1 (NSC), as well as
certain club team owners.10 2 Because the NFF began before Nigeria gained
its independence from the United Kingdom, all of the NFF's original seven
chairmen were from foreign countries. 10 3 Before the creation of a national
soccer federation in Nigeria, there were several smaller confederations;10 4 a
singular association was not created until 1945.'0°
The chairmanship of the NFF has had a volatile history, with few
chairmen holding the position for more than a year.10 6  This volatility
worsened as a result of the fact that the chairmanship became an increasingly
political position chosen by the NSC after 1960.107 Upon termination of his
duty as Secretary General of the NFF, Momodu Kadin said that the NFF was
"the strongest political party in Nigeria.''
10 8
As seen in Brazil, it is dangerous when the head of a nation's soccer
federation is closely tied with politics because a lack of accountability results
when the people responsible for overseeing the activities of a sports
association are also those whose personal assets are at stake. This lack of
independence typically allows for corruption and mismanagement; indeed,
exactly what happened in Nigerian soccer over the last forty to fifty years. 09
101 The Nigerian government created the NSC in 2006 to create coordination between the
government and the various sports organizations throughout Nigeria. History of NSC, NAT'L
SPORTS COMM'N, http://www.sportscommission.gov.ng/x/index.phpoption=com_content&vi
ew=article&id=5&Itemid=71 (last visited Mar. 20, 2011).
102 See, e.g., Olukayode Thomas, The Sorry State of Nigerian Sports, PLAYTHEGAME.ORG
(Aug. 9, 2007), http://www.playthegame.org/knowledge-bank/articles/the-sorry-state-of-nigeri
an-sports-1093.html (detailing the interplay between the NFA and the other soccer bodies
(such as the NFL, which organized Nigeria's club teams) in Nigeria and discussing the
corruption and greed of the NFA).
103 Nigerian Football Association Chairmanship, FOOTBALL HOUSE, http://homepage.usask.
ca/-iko340/nfa-history.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2011). For the purposes of this Note, the
Nigerian Football Federation (NFF) and the Nigerian Football Association (NFA) are the same
organization. See Ikeddy Isiguzo, Football's New Year Wails, VANGUARD (Jan. 7, 2011), http://
www.vanguardngr.corn/2011/01/footballE2%80%99s-new-year-wails/ (explaining that the
organization was established by statute as the NFA and that it illegally uses the name NFF).
104 See Nigerian Football Association Chairmanship, supra note 103 (citing regional
organizations in smaller coastal cities).
5 Id.
106 See Organization: Past Chairmen, NIGERIA FOOTBALL FEDERATION, http://www.nigeri
aff.com/PastChairmen.php (last visited Mar. 20, 2011) (showing the name of each chairman
and the duration of each chairmanship).
107 See Nigerian Football Association Chairmanship, supra note 103 (listing each
government-appointed chairman).
108 Id.
109 Id.
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The first instance of corruption in Nigerian soccer occurred when local
clubs began bribing referees. In Nigeria, as recently as 2006, it was legal for
any league referee to accept a bribe, as long as this bribe did not significantly
affect the referee's decisions during a game." 0 It is arguable that, because
referees are going to be offered bribes regardless of the rules, they should be
allowed to take them. However, a referee can hardly be expected to officiate
objectively after receiving a financial interest in the game's outcome.
Besides the obvious negative effects of the bribery on each game, the fact
that other professional sports leagues, such as the United States' National
Basketball Association (NBA), prohibit much less culpable actions on the
part of its referees"' not only casts the Nigerian soccer referees in a bad
light, but also calls into question the legitimacy of the NFF." 2
However, the issues with the NFF and the NSC exceed the problems of
bribery, as corrupt leaders and structural complications inevitably result in a
disorganized association of club leagues. Amos Adamu, a wealthy member
of the executive board of both FIFA and the Confederation of African
Football (CAF), personifies the idea that one person can have too much
influence on the sport." 3 However, even if the allegations of NFF election
110 See Nigerian Referees Given Permission to Take Bribes, ESPN SOCCERNET (Mar. 31,
2006), http://soccemet.espn.go.com/news/story?id=363449&cc=5901 (quoting then Secretary-
General of the NFF, Fanny Amun as saying," 'We know match officials are offered money or
anything to influence matches and they can accept it' "but referees should simply pretend that
the bribe will influence their decisions on the field, accept the bribe, and then officiate the
game in an unbiased manner). But see Johnson Ayantunji, NRA Promises to Halt Bribery of
Referees, DAILY INDEP. (Lagos) (Mar. 1, 2011), available at http://allafrica.com/stories/2011
03020394.html ("The newly inaugurated executive committee of the Nigeria Football
Referees Association (NRA) has mapped out steps to stop bribery, incentives and gratuity to
referees by home team[s].").
11' See Report: Donaghy's Release Wednesday, ESPN (Nov. 4, 2009), http://sports.espn.go.
com/nba/news/story?id=4615934 (detailing that an ex-NBA referee, Tim Donaghy, was
sentenced to fifteen months in prison, not for directly receiving a bribe, but for merely
providing what he thought to be insights about match-ups and teams of games that he
officiated; Donaghy would talk to players and coaches and would report any information that
the normal spectator would not know about to sports betting agencies).
112 See Onochie Anibeze, We Run the Most Corrupt League, VANGUARD (Nov. 25, 2008),
available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200811250258.html (quoting the Chairman of the FC
Abuja club in the title of the article and noting the Chairman's belief that in despite of
television coverage, Nigerian refereeing was substandard due to corruption).
"13 See Olukayode Thomas, How Elections in the Nigerian Football Association Were Fixed,
GUARDIAN (Nigeria) (Sept. 8, 2006), available at http://www.playthegame.org/news/detailed/ho
w-elections-in-the-nigerian-football-association-were-fixed-1286.html (expressing the opinion
that Adamu discreetly directed every important election in the NFF and that his power and
influence created a situation where there are no real "elections," merely public formalities which
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tampering by Adamu are exaggerated, at the very least, Adamu has too much
influence. When an official possesses such a presumed level of power, it
demonstrates a lack of oversight and accountability in the election of NFF
leaders. Additionally, given his position on the boards of FIFA and CAF,
Adamu has broad discretion to make decisions, without fear of repercussions
or questioning from the international soccer community.'
1 4
For soccer to thrive in Nigeria, investors must have faith in a solid
investment return. There will be fewer investors if there is concern that
funds will be squandered by warring associations and their officials. The
lack of accountability, intermingling of funds and political power, and
numerous examples of poor judgment 15 demonstrate the harsh reality that
the NFF and NSC are not instilling confidence in foreign investors.
It is evident from Brazil's experience that foreign investment is critical to
sustaining successful soccer leagues, especially in countries that lack an
established reputation for success.' 1 6 Invested funds are necessary to pay
players to stay in their home country and to retain the best coaches. Foreign
investment allows young players and grassroots soccer to flourish and helps
ensure that players are getting the instruction and care that they need.
However, as the practice exists now, when a player attains a certain age, he
generally leaves Nigeria to play for the foreign club that has been supporting
him in Nigeria. Although this practice leaves Nigeria with one less soccer
asset , ' 7 with enough foreign investment, the amount paid for each player
leaving Nigeria can be reinvested to the point where the financial support
will exist to eventually keep more players in Nigeria, as more foreign
pronounce that the candidate whom Adamu chose has indeed been elected to the position).
114 id.
115 See, e.g., Osasu Obayiuwana, Nigerian Football's $236,000 Scandal: Nigerian Football
Is in the Midst of Yet Another Scandal, 485 NEW AFRICAN 88 (2009) (detailing a recent
situation in which $236,000 USD, intended for players' expenses for the World Cup, went
missing from the vault inside the NFF headquarters, and further explaining that the large
amount of money is not legally allowed to be held by a non-banking institution, raising
questions as to why the NFF was keeping such a large sum in its office and why someone was
able to break into the building and steal the money in the middle of the day).
116 See FOER, supra note 20, at 120-21 ("But while the Brazilian style and some Brazilian
plays have flourished in the global economy, Brazil has not.").
1 See Thomas, supra note 102 ("Football only thrives at the academy and grassroots level
and the reason for this is because football agents and managers are using it to scout for
talents.... So many kids, who see football as the escape route from poverty, flock [to these]
academies and grassroots football units. They see playing in the local league as a cause,
where only the unlucky ones and those without talents end.").
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investment could result in club teams being able to pay similar salaries to
those in Europe and elsewhere.
Nigeria and the NFF have also suffered setbacks concerning their
participation in a number of international tournaments. Most notably, the
team was forced to replace almost its entire roster for the 2009 Under-17
World Cup after twenty-nine players failed an MRI bone scan age test.
18
The results of the MRI age test, a test enacted by FIFA to make sure that
players who participate in age-limited tournaments actually meet the age
requirements, meant that all but seven players on Nigeria's team were unable
to play. ' 9 Regardless of whether inaccurate birth certificates or foul play by
the NFF were to blame for the ban on participation in such an important
international tournament, if Nigeria was to be taken seriously in the
international soccer community, such incidents cannot be allowed to happen.
B. Past and Current Legislation in Nigeria and a Roadmap for Further
Reform
The corruption in Nigerian soccer has been partially caused by the fact
that the NSC, NFF, and NFL120 are not set up to function properly; too few
people have too much power. Moreover, though these three entities fight
amongst themselves and question each other's actions, there is no real
accountability or oversight.1 21  When looking at the close connection
between the NSC and the NFF, the last thing that the NFF needs is more
government involvement. As previously stated, many of the same people
that control the NFF derive their power from positions within the NSC.
12 2
Old and outdated legislation in Nigeria is to blame for this connection, as it
requires the government to run the NFF.' 23 This outdated law, Decree 101,
was enacted during the last military dictatorship and is still sound law in the
118 29 U-1 7 Nigerian Players Fail MRI Age Test, JAGUDA (Aug. 25, 2009), http://www.jagu
da.com/2009/08/25/29-u- 17-nigerian-soccer-players-fail-mri-age-test/.
119 Id.
120 See supra note 102 and accompanying text (introducing the NFL as an organization that
oversees the games and tournaments played by the largest of Nigeria's club teams).
121 Thomas, supra note 102.
122 Id.
123 See Oluwashina Okeleji, Minister Slams Nigeria FA, BBC SPORT (Lagos), http://news.
bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/africa/3733766.stm (last updated Oct. 11, 2004) (describing
Decree 101-a law passed in 1992-which gives the government, through the NSC, the
power to both appoint and dissolve NFF leaders and binds the government to the NFF in a
restrictive manner).
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country. 24 In addition, even though Nigeria is now a democracy, the law
that keeps the NFF under direct government control by the NSC is still very
much alive; FIFA has threatened to ban Nigeria from FIFA inclusion for the
country's refusal to repeal this law.
12 5
The problem with such a law is that, as shown in Brazil, operations have a
much higher rate of corruption when a few, unaccountable people hold the
power. 126 However, unlike Brazil, where there seemed to be too little direct
government involvement, the problem with Nigerian soccer is that there
seems to be too much governmental involvement and the lack of
accountability combined with the slow process of decision making from
bureaucratic control creates an environment in which the sport and its
associations cannot operate effectively. 127 Another adverse effect of strict
governmental control is that, because the NFF and its clubs cannot operate as
independent businesses, raising capital is very difficult and most funding
comes directly from the government or through government action. 1
28
Also, watching the crippling effect that Decree 101 and government
control of the NFF had on the sport in Nigeria, FIFA 129 announced in August
2006 that sanctions would be placed on Nigeria if they did not eliminate
government control, which forced them to repeal Decree 101.130 In order to
124 Id.
125 See Pius Anakali, Decree 101, FIFA Statutes and Our Laws, DAILY INDEP. (Lagos) (Jan.
15, 2011), available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201101170457.html.
126 FOER, supra note 20, at 117.
127 See Anakali, supra note 125 (discussing the large role that government plays in Nigerian
soccer-completely funding the activities of the national teams and funding a large portion of
the club teams-and arguing that Nigeria must find a middle between a completely
government-controlled soccer federation and the obviously desirable, but presently infeasible,
independent soccer federation that FIFA wants).
129 Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF], Meeting Everyone's Needs: National Economic Empowerment
and Development Strategy, IMF County Report No. 05/433, at 46-47 (2005), available at http://
planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Nigeria/PRSP/Nigeria%20PR SP.pdf.
129 See FIFA, FIFA STATUTES (2011), available at http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affed
eration/generic/01/48/60/05/fifastatuten201 le.pdf. FIFA is an international soccer
organization founded under Swiss law that has over 200 members. In addition to training and
supplying referees to all its member nations for use during club league play and for
international play, FIFA oversees every aspect of international soccer. FIFA also hosts the
World Cup. In order to participate in any of the major tournaments, or to have any standing in
the international soccer community, a nation must be a member of FIFA and abide by its
statutes. Once a member, the nation may partake in all tournaments and use FIFA's services,
but may also face punishment for any violation of the statues and codes that each member
nation agrees to when it obtains membership. Id.
130 FIFA to Monitor Elections to Nigeria Football Association - Roadmap for Normalisation
of Nigerian Football Laid Down, AIPS MEDIA, http://www.aipsmedia.com/index.php?page=n
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be a member of FIFA, a nation must abide by FIFA'S statutes and a violation
may result in a suspension or expulsion from the federation., 31 One such
statute requires that all member nations have independent national
associations and federations which are free from government ownership or
control.
132
Another adverse effect of tight governmental control is that the chain of
accountability stops with the government and because the government is
running the NFF, there is plenty of room for corruption to continue. 133 If the
NFF were to become independent from the government, the NSC would
likely retain oversight of the NFF, as the NSC would play more of an
oversight role, as it would hopefully move from a direct line of control to
becoming more supervisory. However, the question would remain open
about whether the NFF could stand on its own or if it would produce the
same type of corrupt clubs that crippled Brazilian soccer for so many years if
there is too much of a decrease in government involvement.
134
The best opportunity that Nigerian soccer has to be successful is for the
NFF and the other associations and leagues to become independent entities,
free from the strict government control that now dominates them. 35 The fact
that the influence of Decree 101 still seems to be driving cumbersome and
inefficient government involvement in the NFF suggests that Nigerian soccer
would be better in the hands of a private NFF organization. It has been
shown that Nigeria's broader private sector is able to create thousands of
jobs and the potential to create jobs and additional revenues in a
decentralized, profit-driven, privately-held sector making privatization well
worth any risks that come from lessening direct government management of
the NFF.136 In order to accomplish this change, the Nigerian government and
ews&cod=423&tp=n (last visited Mar. 20, 2011) ("[T]he NFA will notify the government that
Decree 101 must be abolished ... ").
131 See FIFA, supra note 129, arts. 13(g), 15, 17.
132 Id. art. 13(g) ("Members have the following obligations ... to manage their affairs
independently and ensure that their own affairs are not influenced by any third parties.").
133 See IMF, supra note 128, at 47 (citing "political corruption" by those seeking "control of
the state machinery for private or sectarian interests").
134 See Okeleji, supra note 123 (explaining the remarks of a former head of the NSC that the
NFF would not be able to stand on its own, due to the lack of funding and the problems that
are associated with the novelty of an independent sports federation in Nigeria).
135 See IMF, supra note 128, at 47 ("[The Nigerian government should] [e]ncourage private
sector participation in sports administration by setting up independent sports associations and
amending the governance structure of existing ones.").
136 See id at 46-47 ("The private sector has demonstrated enormous capacity ... to run
many sports profitably.").
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the NSC must encourage the creation and support of new and existing
independent soccer associations, repeal any laws similar to Decree 101 that
restrict the private nature of soccer associations, encourage private sector
involvement in the maintenance of Nigeria's infrastructure, and encourage
private sector partnerships with other industrialized nations.
As previously mentioned, there are legitimate concerns with liberalizing
soccer in Nigeria, namely the potential for mismanagement and corruption
like those found in Brazil before its reforms. 37 Also, recent corruption in
Nigeria's banking industry demonstrates the potential for disaster in the
private sector when it lacks government regulation. 38 Laws privatizing the
soccer industry must be drafted with caution and must include certain
provisions for accountability and financial reporting, similar to those in
Brazilian Provisional Measure 2193.139 The goal is not to preclude the
government completely, but instead to grant the NFF and other soccer
associations the freedom to sell tickets, obtain funding and sponsors,
advertising, and employ any standard revenue-generating tactics that are
used by private sector businesses.140  The Nigerian government, ideally
through some form of agency similar to the NSC, should require financial
reporting from each club and from the NFF itself, and should provide any
administrative assistance the NFF or club teams need to be successful. This
government role allows for the necessary oversight and accountability
initially, created in Brazil by Peld's Law, and currently lacking in Nigerian
soccer.
141
The roles of the NSC and the Nigerian government would change
significantly since the NFF and other soccer associations would no longer be
under total government control but rather be privately run with limited
government oversight. To achieve these new roles, the Nigerian government
must first determine the nature of the NSC and pass enabling legislation for
137 Aidar et al., supra note 29, at 245.
138 See Camillus Eboh, C.bank Boss Laments Nigerian "Culture of Corruption," REUTERS
(Dec. 3, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSGEE5B22EO20091203 (detailing the
charges brought against many of Nigeria's banking executives amidst allegations of
corruption, and explaining the culture of political "hob-nobbing" and unethical other practices
that led to a devastating national financial crisis).
139 See Aidar et al., supra note 29, at 245, 257-59 (explaining that Provisional measure
2193/2011 provided for investment incentives and various management oversight practices).
140 See id. at 257 ("[T]hese provisions could encourage new investments . . . and new
business opportunities could open up in the areas of media, licensing, and merchandising.").
141 Id. at 245,255.
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its establishment. 142 The Nigerian legislature must also verify that the NSC,
as well as its officers and board of directors, and the Nigerian people have a
clear understanding of the NSC's important role in the NFF, other private
soccer associations, and to the game of soccer in Nigeria as a whole.
In 2008, acting Director-General of the NSC, Chief (Dr.) Patrick Ekeji,
announced that the decision to invite the private sector to adopt and fund
[sports in Nigeria] ... is consistent with the NSC's policy position. 14' Ekeji,
along with Minister Ndanusa wanted to ensure that the sport sector does not
rely completely on the government for financial support.144  This
privatization plan would also place an emphasis on the grassroots
development of youth athletics, as well as the building and maintenance of
the Nigerian sports infrastructure, which are needed to prepare for a
prosperous future, by allowing foreign investment in private associations to
secure outside revenue and to create more jobs.145 Also, since the NFF and
other associations would be financially independent for the first time,
Minister Ndanusa plans to incorporate a "Public Private Partnership" (PPP)
that "will require that individuals and corporation [sic] share resources and
collaborate with government in designing and planning projects that will
have mutual benefits. 146
Encouraging to the success of the privately-run NFF was the news that
Ndanusa met with United Nations leaders to obtain advice regarding how
best to install, finance, and monitor the Public-Private Partnership. 147 This
142 See Emmanuel Ojeme, Needs Assessment of the National Sports Commission, NATION
(June 12, 2009), http://thenationonlineng.net/web2/articles/27804/l/Needs-assessment-of-the-
National-Sports-Commission-/Page 1.html (detailing the fact that, though the Nigerian
legislature passed creation legislation for the NSC, enabling legislation, signaling that THIS
may be a great venue in which to clear up the role of the NSC by creating enabling legislation
that takes into account privately run entities like the NFF).
143 Sadiq A. Abdullahi, The Politics of Sports Development and Privatization in Nigeria,
NIGERIANS IN AMERICA (Dec. 4, 2008), http://www.nigeriansinamerica.com/articles/3078/l/Th
e-Politics-of-Sports-Development-and-Privatization-in-Nigeria/Page 1 .html.
14 Sadiq A. Abdullahi, Can Ndanusa 's Vision for Sports Stop Corruption, Mismanagement,
and Broken Promises?, NIGERIANS IN AMERICA (Dec. 29, 2008), http://www.nigeriansinamerica.
com/articlees/3136/l/Can-Ndanusas-Vision-for-Sports-Stop-Corruption-Mismanagement-and-Br
oken-Promises/Page 1. html.
145 See id. ("[Siports whether it is recreational or professional has the potential to not only
impact the youths and their social and psychological orientation, it impacts national and
economic development.").
146 Id.
147 Nigerian Minister Welcomes Idea of Sports Patnership with Eritrea, CAPITAL ERITREA
(Oct. 21, 2009), http://www.capitaleritrea.com/sports/nigerian-minister-welcomes-idea-of-patne
rship-with-eritrea-in-sports/.
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move by Ndanusa not only demonstrates a willingness on the part of the
NSC and the Nigerian government to ensure that the PPP is a success, but
also shows that the NSC wants associations like the NFF to succeed
independently. The meetings between Ndanusa and the United States also
produced suggestions that led to the NSC's creation of certain tax incentives
for both foreign and domestic investments in Nigerian sports. 1
48
Also, once independent of total government control, the NFF and other
associations must ensure that the free agency problem does not allow teams
outside of Nigeria to sign Nigerian players without paying a transfer fee.
Also, once the NSC enabling legislation is passed and each involved party
has a clearer understanding of their roles, the NSC and the NFF must take a
closer look, as the Brazilian legislature did, at the various fees and
compensation requirements that accompany both the transfer of players
between clubs within Nigeria and also in the acquisition of Nigerian players
by foreign clubs. When one of its players goes abroad, Nigeria should reap
the benefit of such a transfer by implementing regulations similar to those
enacted in Brazil that take the money received in the exchange and invest it
in grassroots and infrastructure projects. By implementing these changes,
one day the country's most talented players will not need to leave Nigeria in
order to play in the best leagues in the world.
IV. CONCLUSION
For too long, too much government influence crippled the game of soccer
in Nigeria. Based on the lessons learned from Brazil, Nigeria's government
should limit its involvement to an oversight role, rather than comingling the
soccer industry with the government to the point where there is no clear
separation between the Nigerian legislature, the NSC, and the NFF. Creating
the independence of the NFF is a vital first step toward rebuilding the game,
but only if the appropriate governmental controls are in place. Government
funding, made available to the NFF, provides a powerful incentive to comply
with government oversight because the NFF will need funding, at least in the
short-term. The NFF must also take a deeper look at the key concepts that
guided Brazil through its reform movements, specifically the use of transfer
and education fees, along with the cautioned use of the free agency system to
ensure that Nigerian soccer does not suffer while the leagues of Europe
prosper.
148 id.
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Though less governmental interference with the game is a positive first
step, the Nigerian government and the NFF must remember the problems
faced by an independent but unaccountable Brazilian soccer club structure
and recognize that there remains an important role for the government in
ensuring the success of Nigerian soccer.

